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INTRODUCTION
Critics of international courts call attention to the fact that these
courts remove important decisions from domestic democratic bodies and
shift them to unelected international bodies.1 To curb the ability of inter-
national courts to seize decision-making power from domestic bodies, in-
ternational courts are usually limited by legal principles of judicial
deference, such as the principle of subsidiary and the margin of apprecia-
tion.2 These rules constrain international courts and prevent them from
making certain decisions.
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1. See generally LORD SUMPTION, THE 27TH SULTAN AZLAN SHAH LECTURE, KUALA
LUMPUR: THE LIMITS OF LAW, 9–15 (Nov. 20, 2013), https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/
speech-131120.pdf (arguing that the European Court of Human Rights suffers from a demo-
cratic deficit because it substitutes the decisions of publicly elected domestic bodies).
2. See Shai Dothan, Introduction to the Symposium Issue: Margin of Appreciation and
Democracy: Human Rights and Deference to Political Bodies (forthcoming 2018) J. INT’L
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Scholars have argued that although international courts may possess
worse democratic credentials than domestic bodies, there are situations in
which the margin of appreciation should be narrowed because democratic
failures hinder domestic bodies from making proper decisions.3 The nar-
rowing of the margin of appreciation allows international courts to make
their own decisions, even against domestic policies. In these situations, the
judgment of the international court may be more in line with democratic
principles than are the decisions domestic bodies can make by themselves.
Some scholars have argued that international courts like the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) take this factor into account and give
less deference to states when there are doubts about the quality of their
domestic democratic process.4
This answer to the critics may address the content of international
judgments, but it leaves open another problem. Even if the decision that
an international court makes is better per se, that decision is still taken
away from democratic bodies. Public deliberation—which is essential for
democracy to persist—does not take place. Without public deliberation,
the ability of democratic bodies to function in future situations is ham-
pered and enervated.5
But this argument ignores all that happens after an international court
issues its judgment. The judgment of an international court is never the
last word on an issue. States will react to the judgments issued against
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (2018) (defining the margin of appreciation doctrine—a doctrine de-
vised by the European Court of Human Rights to regulate when it should and when it should
not intervene in the policy choices of countries. The principle of subsidiarity is related to the
margin of appreciation as it is the general principle that protects domestic bodies from inter-
national intervention. The paper suggests that the margin of appreciation is usually justified
with reference to the claim that domestic bodies are either better or more legitimate deci-
sion-makers, but it is often applied because of political necessity rather than normative justi-
fications); Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International
Law?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907, 919-921 (2006) (explaining that a potential justification for the
application of the margin of appreciation doctrine by international courts is that international
courts are not democratically accountable).
3. See Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus and Universal Standards,
31 NYU J. INT’L L. POL. 843, 849 (1999) (arguing that the ECtHR should narrow the margin
of appreciation in cases which concern minorities, because they are not properly represented
by the democratic process). Shai Dothan, In Defence of Expansive Interpretation in the
ECHR, 3 CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 508 (2014) (arguing that the ECtHR should be
allowed to use expansive interpretation in cases of potential democratic failures).
4. See ANDREW LEGG, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW: DEFERENCE AND PROPORTIONALITY 27–31 (2012); Andreas von Staden, The
Democratic Legitimacy of Judicial Review Beyond the State: Normative Subsidiarity and Judi-
cial Standards of Review, 10 INT’L J. CON. L. 1023, 1042 (2012); Oddny´ Mjo¨ll Arnardo´ttir,
The Differences that Make a Difference: Recent Developments on the Discrimination Grounds
and the Margin of Appreciation under Article 14 of the European Convention on Human
Rights, 14 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 647, 664–65 (2014).
5. See Lord Sumption, supra note 1, at 15 (suggesting that taking away decisions from
democratic bodies and transferring them to courts can lead to a slow process of democratic
decline).
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them, and the public will debate them. Consequently, international courts
can foster rather than forestall democratic deliberation.
In addition, international courts improve democratic deliberation be-
cause they can supply legal arguments that initiate a more elaborate and a
more fruitful debate. The legal language used by international courts
transforms debates about pure political interests into debates about rights
that are grounded in legal theory.
International courts also have a positive effect on the actors who en-
gage in deliberation and on the way this deliberation takes place. Interna-
tional courts provide useful arenas for training the future leaders of
international law and for creating social contacts between international
lawyers. International courts provide social arenas in which fruitful delib-
eration can take place. This paper uses the tools of Social Network Analy-
sis, a powerful social science methodology, to demonstrate the ways
international courts improve the information flow between segments of
the public engaged in deliberation.
The paper starts with the effects of international courts on the broader
public and narrows down to their influence on a small elite of lawyers. Part
I suggests that international courts captivate the public imagination, al-
lowing citizens to articulate their rights. Part II demonstrates how govern-
ments, parliaments, and national courts around the world interact with
international courts in ways that improve public deliberation. Part III
studies the global elite of lawyers that work in conjunction with interna-
tional courts to shape policy. Part IV concludes by arguing that the dia-
logue fostered between international courts and democratic bodies does,
in fact, lead to more vibrant democratic deliberation.
I. THE GENERAL PUBLIC: FROM INTERESTS TO RIGHTS
A. The Myth of International Courts
When people cut in line in front of a supermarket in Russia, one
sometimes hears the crowd threaten them with an application to the
ECtHR in Strasburg.6 Conscientious objectors in Israel sometimes
threaten the army officers that imprison them with prosecution at the In-
ternational Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague.7 These statements are
legal nonsense, but they may reflect the most significant impact that inter-
national courts have today on the actual behavior of countries.
International courts capture the imagination of the public. The layper-
son seems to think that these courts are incredibly powerful beings, with
an enormous impact on her everyday life. If people only knew how weak
6. Skype conversation with Russian NGO activist Nov. 15, 2016.
7. See Dalia Karpal, The Story of the Struggle of the Conscientious Objector Natan
Blanc, HAARETZ (May 30, 2013), http://www.haaretz.co.il/magazine/.premium-1.2033798
(Hebrew) (where the conscientious objector Jonathan Ben-Artzi—whose story of refusing to
report for mandatory military service attracted much attention in the Israeli media—relates
how he threatened the senior officer who sent him to prison with future prosecution by an
international court. He told the press that the officer judged him for a long period in prison
and when he returned before her once again, she transferred his case to her superior officer).
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and slow most international courts are, they would fear these courts much
less or, alternatively, find other institutions to admire.8 As it is, interna-
tional courts owe a lot of their significance to pure ignorance—the public
believes they are strong, and this false belief becomes their primary source
of strength.
Maybe the word ignorance is a bit misleading. People do know that
international courts exist. As far as the empirical evidence goes, they are
even interested in them. People search for the ECtHR and the Court of
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on Google, and popular newspa-
pers regularly cover the judgments of these two courts.9 But the depth of
knowledge even about these highly salient courts leaves much to be de-
sired. This is evident from the fact that many newspapers mistake one
court for the other.10 In fact, many of the British citizens that voted to exit
the European Union in the so-called Brexit probably thought this move
would permanently absolve them from the censure of the ECtHR, which
actually covers all members of the Council of Europe.11
A vivid example of the way international courts changed the global
arena is the viral internet campaign Kony 2012. This campaign—which
centered around a half-hour YouTube clip with more than 100 million
views by 2016—called on the public to put pressure on their representa-
tives to help arrest militia leader Joseph Kony.12 The strategy behind the
campaign was to change the world from the bottom up. The underlying
idea was that every individual that hangs a poster in favor of Kony’s arrest
or sends a letter to a senator can make a difference.
Coordinating the public is a difficult task. Most of the public is unin-
formed and indifferent and has little effect on politics. This is exactly why
most people lie at the mercy of small and well-organized interest groups
that control the political arena.13 International courts are a way to get peo-
8. See Kyle T. Jones, The Many Troubles of the ICC, NAT’L INTEREST (Dec. 6, 2012),
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-many-troubles-the-icc-7822?page=3.
9. See Erik Voeten, Public Opinion and the Legitimacy of International Courts, 14.2
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 411, 419-423 (2013).
10. See id. at 422.
11. See Tim Worstall, Misunderstanding Brexit—Scrapping The Human Rights Act for
a British Bill of Rights, FORBES (Aug. 23 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/
2016/08/23/misunderstanding-brexit-scrapping-the-human-rights-act-for-a-british-bill-of-
rights/#36241934e25f (explaining that many people, and many politicians, misunderstand the
Brexit. Contrary to what some may think, the British Human Rights Act cannot be changed
in a way that denies rights protected by the European Convention on Human Rights—even
after the Brexit, simply because the European Convention applies to the Council of Europe,
not to the European Union).
12. KONY 2012, YOUTUBE (Mar. 5, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y4Mn
pzG5Sqc.
13. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND
THE THEORY OF GROUPS, 33–34 (1965) (arguing that in a big group every member receives
only a small share of the benefits obtained by the group, reducing the incentive of members
of big groups to invest in the group’s collective interest. This gives an important advantage to
small interest groups); MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC
GROWTH, STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES 74 (1982) (explaining how the superior
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ple informed and motivated. The fact that Kony was indicted by the ICC
helped to create awareness of his crimes. Furthermore, it helped cement
an effective public campaign behind the idea that there is a forum where
Kony can be brought to justice. While Kony remains a fugitive, the idea
that somewhere in The Hague there is a court that will prosecute the most
heinous war crimes is incredibly powerful. It gives the public a sense that
they can affect politics, as well as a sense of purpose that they never had
before.14
The myth of international courts is the key to their impact, but these
courts are more than just a symbol. There are several mechanisms that are
critical to their success. These mechanisms will now be addressed.
B. Supplying Arguments for Public Debate
Few, if any, international courts have an authority that directly com-
mands the attention and compliance of the public itself.15 Nevertheless,
international courts do have a profound impact on the public debate. They
form an arena, imperfect as it may be, that is not motivated solely by na-
ked power, an arena that is susceptible to arguments about legal rights.16
Scholars have noted this role—shifting the discourse from power to
rights—as one of the key functions that courts serve in society. Courts
interpret vague documents that leave plenty of room for differences of
opinion and contesting theories.17 Yet despite the discretion the ambiguity
of legal language gives judges, they are not free to decide these cases as
ability of small groups to organize compared to big groups is likely to have harmful economic
implications); Susanne Lohmann, An Information Rationale for the Power of Special Inter-
ests, 92.4 AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 809, 812 (1998) (suggesting that members of big groups face
difficulties when they try to inform themselves about the actions of their representatives);
Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 724 (1985) (concluding
that big groups are sometimes the most socially vulnerable).
14. See ICC: First Lord’s Resistance Army Trial Begins – Thousands of Victims Partici-
pating in Case, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/12/05/icc-
first-lords-resistance-army-trial-begins.
15. See Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer & Mikael Rask Madsen, How Context
Shapes the Authority of International Courts, 79 L. & CONTEM. PROBS. 1, 11–12 (2016) (ex-
plaining that international courts usually do not have so-called popular authority, namely
their rulings do not have an authority that is recognized directly by the general public).
16. See SHAI DOTHAN, REPUTATION AND JUDICIAL TACTICS: A THEORY OF NA-
TIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS 63–69 (2015) (describing the legal constraints on inter-
national courts that determine their judgments together with the political constraints they are
subject to).
17. See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, 124–26 (1961). In addition to the
ambiguity of language, American Legal Realists argued that judges have discretion because
there are usually multiple legal rules pertaining to the same issue and because the application
of law to facts naturally involves discretion. See Brian Leiter, Legal Realism, in A COMPAN-
ION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 261, 266–67 (Patterson ed., 1996); Hanoch
Dagan, The Realist Conception of Law, 57 U. TORONTO. L.J. 607, 614–16 (2007). Some schol-
ars argue that judicial discretion is even wider in international law, because international law
includes rules that rely on contradictory goals and reasons and do not come together to form
one coherent system. See MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUC-
TURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT, 590–91 (2005).
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they please.18 Judges must provide reasons for their decisions that rely on
the values enshrined in the texts that guide them.19 The values that the
judges identify and the forms of argument that they use can later guide the
public debate within society. In this way, judges do not silence the debate.
Instead, they turn the debate into a discussion about values and
principles.20
Judgments can provide depth and meaning to public values because
they concretely apply these values to specific situations.21 Judgments can
therefore teach the public how to argue for their rights and enrich public
deliberation. Scholars have argued that national courts are tasked with ful-
filling this role,22 but international courts at the beginning of the twenty-
first century seem more capable than ever of playing it as well.
A way to address the impact of international courts on public debate
is to look for situations in which these courts changed the legal discourse
outside of their formal jurisdiction. In these situations, judges who are not
formally bound by the judgments of an international court nevertheless
refer to these judgments and learn from their reasoning. One can only
assume that if an international court manages to crystallize public debate
in another country that is not bound by its judgments, the effect on dis-
course in the areas under the court’s jurisdiction will be even greater.
The examples that follow include judgments of supreme courts in sev-
eral countries. These judgments rely on principles put forward by interna-
tional courts that do not have binding jurisdiction in that country. If these
principles impact the highest level of the judiciary in foreign jurisdictions,
this may indicate a general change of discourse precipitated by interna-
tional courts.
The first example demonstrates the impact of an international court
on the U.S. Supreme Court, a court known for its policy of American ex-
ceptionalism and its reluctance to learn from foreign law.23 Justice
Anthony Kennedy, who delivered the opinion of the Court in the
landmark case Lawrence v. Texas,24 decided to overrule Bowers v. Hard-
wick,25 a Supreme Court case which had only recently found the criminal-
18. See AHARON BARAK, JUDICIAL DISCRETION 35–46 (Yadin Kaufmann trans., 1987).
19. See generally Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633 (1995).
20. See Frank I. Michelman, The Constitution, Social Rights, and Liberal Political Justi-
fication, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 13, 34 (2003).
21. Cf. Ferderick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law? 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 884
(2006) (criticizing the idea that deciding cases based on concrete disputes leads to superior
results and calling attention to the fact that concrete factual situations may distort judges).
22. See Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 29–30
(1979); Owen M. Fiss, The Social and Political Foundations of Adjudication, 6 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 121, 125 (1982).
23. Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV.
431, 439 (2005) (explaining that it was “virtually unprecedented” for Justices of the U.S.
Supreme Court to use foreign judgments to assist in the interpretation of the United States
Constitution).
24. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
25. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
Spring 2018] International Courts Improve Public Deliberation 223
ization of sodomy to be constitutional. The concurring judgment of Justice
Warren Burger in Bowers asserted that criminalizing homosexual conduct
is prevalent in Western civilization and supported by “Judeo-Christian
moral and ethical standards,”26 an assertion that Justice Kennedy tried to
disprove. As evidence that Western civilization does not unanimously en-
dorse criminalizing homosexual conduct, Justice Kennedy referred to the
ECtHR case of Dudgeon v. United Kingdom.27 This case held that
criminalizing consensual homosexual sex between adults violates the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights.28 The reference to the ECtHR
does not reflect any legally binding obligation to uphold its judgments.
Instead, it demonstrates a change in the discourse and the public percep-
tion that was initiated, in part, by the judgment of an international court.
Another illustrative example is the dissent written by Judge Michael
Kirby in the High Court of Australia case of New South Wales v. Amery.
Kirby expansively interpreted the Australian Anti-Discrimination Act,
reading it as the culmination of national and international developments
directed at correcting the unfair payment of different salaries based on
gender to workers doing essentially the same work. Kirby decided that the
purpose of judgments of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) enforcing
the European law principle of “equal pay for equal work” was sufficiently
similar to the purpose of anti-discrimination legislation in Australia to jus-
tify learning from these international judgments. Kirby took note of ECJ
judgments that view differences in payment of women and men as pre-
sumptively contrary to European law, unless the differences can be justi-
fied by objective factors that are not discriminatory. He argued that in
light of such judgments, it would be wrong to construe Australian legisla-
tion narrowly. Australian courts, he asserted, should be willing to inter-
vene when employers set unreasonable requirements that discriminate on
grounds of sex.29 Although Kirby wrote only the dissent in this case, his
judgment demonstrates how a general principle—equal pay for equal
work—that was championed and developed by the ECJ has an impact on
judicial opinions in states that are nowhere near the jurisdiction of that
international court.30
Another example of the influence of international courts outside their
jurisdiction concerns an Israeli judgment that prohibited the use of certain
interrogation techniques on suspected terrorists. One of these interroga-
tion techniques was known as “Shabach.” It included handcuffing the in-
terrogated person, sitting him on a low and especially uncomfortable chair,
26. Id. at 196 (Burger, J., concurring).
27. Lawrence v. Texas, supra note 24, at 572–73.
28. Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981).
29. The State of New South Wales v. Amery and Others, [2006] HCA 14 ¶¶. 168–71
(Austl.).
30. This is just one example demonstrating the way non-binding international judg-
ments had an influence on anti-discrimination law in Australia. This influence is noted in
HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EQUAL PAY HANDBOOK (1998), https:/
/www.humanrights.gov.au/sites/default/files/content/pdf/sex_discrim/equal_pay.pdf.
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covering his head with an opaque bag, and subjecting him to noisy mu-
sic.31 The Israeli High Court of Justice decided that this interrogation tech-
nique was illegal and conducted without authority.32
The Israeli court referred to the ECtHR judgment of Ireland v. United
Kingdom.33 This judgment decided that similar, but not identical, tech-
niques used by the United Kingdom violated the European Convention on
Human Rights because they constituted inhuman and degrading treat-
ment, even if they did not cause enough suffering to be considered tor-
ture.34 The Israeli court was clearly influenced by the moral standards
promoted by the ECtHR, although Israel does not fall under the jurisdic-
tion of the European Convention on Human Rights.
These cases suggest that international courts exert an influence that
exceeds the binding force of their judgments. They frame the public de-
bate by defining principles such as equal pay for equal work. These princi-
ples become the starting point of any informed discussion on the subject.
Even if lawyers or political parties want to diverge from these principles,
they cannot ignore them.
International courts also uphold moral standards that become an in-
ternational norm. Countries that wish to deviate from this norm will signal
to the international community that they do not care enough about their
international standing to pay the costs involved with conforming to inter-
nationally-accepted standards. This is a dangerous signal as it can damage
the state’s international reputation and affect the way other countries per-
ceive its credibility.35
C. Forming Communities of Activists
International courts are not just elitist institutions populated by a
small group of professional judges who hear arguments from a closed cir-
cle of top counselors.36 Today, international courts such as the ECtHR and
31. HCJ 5100/94 Public Committee Against Torture v. Israel 53(4) IsrSC 817, ¶ 26 to
the judgment of the President Aharon Barak (1999).
32. Id. at ¶ 30.
33. Id.
34. Ireland v. The United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A), at ¶ 167 (1978).
35. See ANDREW GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS – A RATIONAL
CHOICE THEORY 34–35 (2008) (explaining that violating international law damages states’
reputation by signalling they do not care about their standing in the international community.
This signal suggests the state is willing to forgo future benefit for an immediate gain, a quality
that makes states a less reliable treaty partner and will lead to worse deals in future negotia-
tions). My research mentioned in infra note 37 provides empirical support for the argument
that reputational damage is caused to states when they disobey international courts. That
paper concluded that states strive to protect their international reputation and the better
their current reputation, the more states are willing to pay to preserve it.
36. See Sara Dezalay & Yves Dezalay, Professionals of International Justice from the
Shadow of State Diplomacy to the Pull of the Market of Arbitration, in INT’L LAW AS A PRO-
FESSION (eds. Andre Nollkaemper et al) 11, 13 (suggesting that the group of counselors argu-
ing before the International Court of Justice is small and highly connected, with difficult
barriers of entry).
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the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) are still staffed by a
small core of legal professionals, but this core is connected, in turn, to a
much larger periphery of lawyers and activists. The impact that interna-
tional courts have on society is partly due to the dense connections be-
tween the elite core of lawyers and the larger periphery surrounding them.
The ECtHR is constantly looking for ways to improve its connections
with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and human rights activists.
In 2011, the Committee of Ministers—the body charged with enforcing
ECtHR judgments—launched a new publicly available website. This web-
site is dedicated to publishing reports by NGOs that document states’ non-
compliance with ECtHR judgments. In the first four years of the website’s
existence, more than two hundred organizations submitted reports that
were published on the website. Numerous reports were submitted collec-
tively by several NGOs and led to cooperation across organizations.37 This
large group of highly-motivated activists opens new avenues for the court
to influence public discourse.
Empirical research that I conducted shows that those NGOs focus
their reports on the most severe violations and the most legally–important
judgments issued by the ECtHR.38 This finding suggests that the commu-
nity of NGOs which submitted reports collectively process information in
an efficient way. They form what is known in Social Network Analysis as a
“bandwidth network”—a network that minimizes the biases of its mem-
bers and leads to increasingly accurate collective assessments. This type of
network contrasts with “echo networks,” which intensify biases held
within the group during the process of communication.39
What makes the network of NGOs a bandwidth network? First, the
relative independence of NGOs from one another decreases the chances
that NGOs will be pressured to follow the assessments of others.40 Second,
the NGOs in the group are very different from one another. They vary in
size. Their staff come from different countries and different cultures, and
they have different specializations and skills. Because the NGOs are so
different, they are likely to have different worldviews and to voice argu-
37. See Shai Dothan, A Virtual Wall of Shame: The New Way of Imposing Reputational
Sanctions on Defiant States, 27 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L. L. 141 (2017). See also Submis-
sions from States, applicants, NGOs and NHRIs, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, https://www.coe.int/
cs/web/execution/submissions (last visited Mar. 21, 2018).
38. See Dothan, supra note 37 at 149–59.
39. See RONALD S. BURT, BROKERAGE & CLOSURE: AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL
CAPITAL 167–68 (2005).
40. See Mark Granovetter, Threshold Models of Collective Behavior, 83 AMER. J. SOC.
1420, 1423, 1429 (1978) (explaining that close connections between group members mean
that only a few members are necessary to exert a pressure on others to conform and form a
so-called “cascade” of views.). People may follow one another because of social pressure,
what is known as “reputational cascades,” but they may also follow one another because they
try to learn from the views of others. Trying to learn from others may sometimes propagate
mistakes and lead to so-called “informational cascades”; see Eric Posner & Cass Sunstein,
The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV. 131, 161–63 (2006).
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ments that balance each other out instead of reinforcing existing biases.41
Third, every NGO has a specific agenda and clear tasks, a quality that
experiments have shown limits the deterioration of groups to extreme
views in the process of deliberation.42 All these qualities make the assess-
ments of this large group of human rights activists realistic and sound.43
The community of NGOs is therefore a useful tool for disseminating
accurate information about the ECtHR and its judgments. Social Network
Analysis shows that the network structure that surrounds the ECtHR—
which includes a small core of elite professionals and a large periphery
connected to it—promotes the flow of information within the network as a
whole. Research in epidemiology shows that social groups that have a
densely connected core (for example, people with many sexual partners)
that connects with the larger periphery (that is, have sex with people who
have only a few sexual partners), a process known as “dissortative mix-
ing,” are likely to spread diseases more quickly than groups that have a
more disconnected core and periphery.44 The same logic that works for
sexually transmitted diseases works for information. The core of elite pro-
fessionals is where the ideas that shape international courts are born and
developed. But the true social impact of the court comes from the connec-
tions that this group has with a much larger group of lawyers and activists
interacting with the court and its enforcement bodies.
The ECtHR is using the social network described above to assist with
the enforcement of its judgments. This may be a useful tool because the
ECtHR enjoys relatively high rates of compliance and can aspire to
change the world directly through the enforcement of its judgments.45
41. See Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes? 110
YALE L. J. 71, 89–90 (2000) (explaining that when group members are only exposed to a
limited and biased set of arguments, they are likely to shift to more extreme views).
42. See CASS. R. SUNSTEIN & REID HASTIE, WISER: GETTING BEYOND GROUPTHINK
TO MAKE GROUPS SMARTER 111–12 (2015).
43. See Shai Dothan, Social Networks and the Enforcement of International Law, in
EDWARD ELGAR RES. HANDBOOK ON THE SOC. OF INT’L L. (Andrew Lang & Moshe Hirsch
eds., forthcoming 2018).
44. See Edward O. Laumann & Yoosik Youm, Racial/Ethnic Group Differences in the
Prevalence of Sexually Transmitted Diseases in the United States: A Network Explanation, 26
SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES 250 (1999).
45. The exact rates of compliance with ECtHR judgments are difficult to measure.
Besides problems with acquiring the relevant information, one must consider, for example,
how to treat cases of delayed compliance or compliance with only part of the dictates of the
judgment, see Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribu-
nals, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1, 65–66 (2005) (explaining that it is difficult to reach conclusive results
on the ECHR’s compliance rates). However, most of the sources that tested the ECtHR’s
compliance rates find them to be very high, see R. Ryssdal, The Enforcement System set up
under the European Convention on Human Rights, in COMPLIANCE WITH JUDGMENTS OF
INTERNATIONAL COURTS 49, 67 (M.K. Bulterman & M. Kuijer eds., 1996) (claiming that
there are virtually no cases of noncompliance, although there are some cases of delayed or
partial compliance); Andrew Moravcsik, Explaining International Human Rights Regimes:
Liberal Theory and Western Europe, 1 EUR. J. INT’L. REL. 157, 171 (1995); Laurence R.
Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication,
107 YALE L.J. 273, 296 (1997).
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Other courts, for example the IACHR, do not have this privilege. The
IACHR faces such low rates of compliance that it must settle for shaping
society in a more indirect way than enforcing its judgments.46
By exposing information about violations and acting, in essence, as a
stage where arguments are presented in front of the public, the IACHR
can influence long-term social processes in the countries under its jurisdic-
tion. Research shows that IACHR judges understand part of their judicial
role as related to disseminating information in this way.47 This leads to
forms of judicial behavior that may seem odd when compared to those of
courts that are committed to ensuring compliance with their judgments.
For example, the IACHR does not simply close a case when a state accepts
responsibility for its actions. Instead, the court will follow up on accept-
ance of responsibility with days of hearing, collecting evidence from wit-
nesses, and presenting and analyzing the relevant facts.48 All these actions
do not affect immediate compliance—since the state already admitted it is
guilty of misconduct—but they expose and disseminate information about
state practice, leading to a long-term impact on future conduct of states in
the region.
The information disseminated by courts reaches far beyond public of-
ficials. This information is regularly reviewed in the media, even if it is
often reviewed inadequately.49 The media spreads this information to the
public. Armed with this information, the public exercises its influence on
state administration from the bottom up.
Certainly, some members of the public, such as human rights lawyers,
have a greater influence on the political and legal conditions in their
states.50 But every person who acts based on the values and principles set
forth by international courts can make a difference. Every person who
votes, or participates in demonstrations, or writes to the local newspaper
can exert an influence that reaches all the way to the highest echelons of
power.51
46. See Alexandra Huneeus, Courts Resisting Courts: Lessons from the Inter-American
Court’s Struggle to Enforce Human Rights, 44 CORNELL INT’L. L. J. 493, 504 (2011) (arguing
that states complied with only one out of ten IACHR judgments); James L. Cavallaro &
Stephanie Erin Brewer, Reevaluating Regional Human Rights Litigation in the Twenty-First
Century: The Case of the Inter-American Court, 102 AM. J. INT’L. L. 768, 786 (2008) (assessing
the rates of compliance with the IACHR as 11.57%); Posner & Yoo, supra note 45, at 43
(estimating a five percent compliance rate with the IACHR).
47. See Cavallaro & Brewer, supra note 46 at 816–17.
48. See id. at 808–16.
49. See supra note 10.
50. See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 929
(1996) (describing so-called “norm entrepreneurs” that can cause an especially significant
change to the norms in their society); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey Interna-
tional Law?, 106 YALE L. J. 2599, 2612 (1997) (describing the work of “transnational moral
entrepreneurs” who had a strong impact on the development of international law).
51. See Harold Hongju Koh, How is International Human Rights Law Enforced? 74
IND. L. J. 1397, 1416 (1999) (explaining how individuals can promote the enforcement of
international human rights law as part of a so-called “transnational legal process”).
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Traditionally, international law has developed when diplomats from
different countries met and tried to further their state interests. The inter-
esting interactions happened between the tip of the pyramids of political
power, in an environment that was closed off from most segments of the
public.52 Now, we live in what scholars have called, “a new world order,” a
world in which most of the influential interactions take place between
mid-level bureaucrats across national boundaries.53 National judges talk to
each other,54 as do members of the executive, the military, and the bank-
ing system in different states. The networks that form between these pro-
fessionals can generate political changes that fall beneath the radar of
international law.55
This may be a dangerous development for those who believe in the
authority of international law.56 Yet it also forms an opportunity for those
who believe in influence from the bottom up. If influential developments
are not limited to connections between the very top of national hierar-
chies, people can shape the international arena by more directly influenc-
ing mid-level professionals in their own country. Filing a case in a national
court can have an immediate international influence because national
judges are now part of their own global network, without the mediation of
professional diplomats.57
The analysis above suggests that international courts do not just pro-
mote deliberation; the public deliberation that international courts initiate
has a real impact on state behavior. Public officials may be unconstrained
by international law, but they are constrained by the public, and the pub-
lic, in turn, is molded by international courts.
52. See Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age of Globalization, 98 MICH. L. REV.
167, 184–86 (1999) (explaining that treaty negotiation and, to a lesser extent, treaty ratifica-
tion are controlled by government representatives of the executive and subject to minimal
public scrutiny. These government representatives could be easily captured by interest
groups).
53. See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004).
54. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J.
191 (2003).
55. This phenomenon was dubbed “informal international law.” See Joost Pauwelyn,
Ramses A. Wessel, & Jan Wouters, An Introduction to Informal International Lawmaking, in
INFORMAL INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING (eds. Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses A. Wessel, & Jan
Wouters, 2012) 1, 3.
56. See Armin von Bogdandy, Philipp Dann, & Matthias Goldmann, Developing the
Publicness of Public International Law: Towards a Legal Framework for Global Governance
Activities, 9 GERMAN L. J. 1375, 1400 (2008) (explaining the importance of global governance
by institutions which are part of public international law); Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch,
& Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 15, 16–17 (2005) (arguing that the transnational effects of policy in a globalized world
create a problem of accountability. The growing field of Global Administrative Law studies
mechanisms to solve this problem).
57. See Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses A. Wessel, & Jan Wouters, The Exercise of Public
Authority through Informal International Lawmaking: An Accountability Issue?, Jean Mon-
net Working Paper 06/11, 11–12, http://doc.utwente.nl/81510/1/JMWP06Wessel.pdf.
Spring 2018] International Courts Improve Public Deliberation 229
II. GOVERNMENTS: PRE-EMPTION AND STRATEGY
International courts are constrained institutions. They are never com-
pletely free. States can limit the ability of international courts to act and
decide cases. The literature differentiates between mechanisms used to
constrain courts before they make their decision—for example by clearly
defining treaty terms—and mechanisms used to constrain courts who al-
ready issued decisions states disagree with. States can demonstrate this
disagreement by failing to comply with a decision, exiting a court’s juris-
diction, cutting a court’s budget, and so on.58 What mechanisms used to
limit the court and mechanisms used to punish it have in common is that
they both try to shape the court’s judgments themselves. They either try to
prevent the court from issuing certain judgments or to deter the court
from making future unwelcome decisions.
This part discusses a different form of constraint on the impact of
courts. It is focused on the processes that come into play once the court’s
judgment is already issued. These mechanisms are not intended to shape
the court’s decisions or to retaliate for its misconduct. Instead, they miti-
gate the otherwise democratic deliberation-ending influence that final
judgments have on society. While the judgment itself is unchanged, these
processes may turn its actual impact around. Instead of pre-empting dem-
ocratic deliberation, the judgment may end up promoting political debate.
The sub-parts that follow demonstrate such processes in the executive, leg-
islative, and judicial branches of government.
A. The Executive Branch
The CJEU (formerly called the ECJ)59 was hailed by many as an ex-
ample of an effective court, a court that had a great impact on the Euro-
pean Union and the states within it.60 Yet scholars have argued that even
58. See Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create International
Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 CAL. L. REV. 899, 944–54 (2005)
(separating between such “ex-ante” and “ex-post” mechanisms for constraining courts). For
later discussions and examples of such mechanisms, see Tom Ginsburg, Bounded Discretion
in International Judicial Lawmaking, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 631 (2005); Jacob Katz Cogan, Com-
petition and Control in International Adjudication, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 411 (2008); DOTHAN,
supra note 16, at 87–101.
59. The court changed its name following an organizational change initiated by the
Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the
European Community, signed at Lisbon on Dec. 13, 2007.
60. See Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 276 (1997) (arguing that the ECJ managed to
compel compliance with its judgment as well as a national court); KAREN J. ALTER, THE
EUROPEAN COURT’S POLITICAL POWER – SELECTED ESSAYS 100–01 (2009) (arguing that the
ECJ’s effectiveness increased due to cooperation with lower national courts that strategically
referred to it judgments when they favored its expected decision); J.H.H. Weiler, A Quiet
Revolution: The European Court of Justice and its Interlocutors, 26 COMP. POL. STUD. 510
(1994) (explaining why national courts, governments and academics did not resist the ECJ
and allowed it to increase its power over time); J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Eu-
rope, 100 YALE L. J. 2403, 2447 (1991) (describing judicial strategies such as incrementalism
used by the ECJ to increase its power).
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this court cannot compel states to comply directly with its judgments.
Rather, a CJEU judgment is only the beginning of a long process. For a
judgment to have a real effect on society, it must receive the support of
powerful social actors. It must be accompanied by many similar future
cases and by political movements that push policy in the same direction
suggested by the court. Only in this way can the attempts of the executive
to repress the judgment be resisted.61
Lisa Conant named this phenomenon “Contained Justice.” She gives a
powerful example of how this dynamic works within the European Union.
The ECJ’s Cassis decision62 attempted to accelerate European integration
by deciding that goods which are produced and marketed lawfully in one
member state could be sold in all other states of the European Union.63
This decision encroached on states’ ability to regulate their own markets
and was, at first, practically ignored. When the European Commission in-
tervened and tried to set European policy according to the ECJ’s decision,
states resisted the change. The public mobilized, with interest groups and
organizations fighting either for or against the ECJ’s initiative and launch-
ing new cases that reached the ECJ. Eventually, a compromise solution
was reached that gave states some ability to control their own regulation
without external influence.64 The ECJ’s original decision was only partly
implemented and only after a long public debate.
One can look at the fact that judgments only have real repercussions if
they are followed by a social movement as an indication that international
courts are limited in their ability to reshape society. But one can also look
at the same phenomenon as an indication that international courts do not
hinder public deliberation. Instead, they may propel and increase delibera-
tion. International courts act as the spark that starts a debate. After they
issue their judgments, interest groups start to act and shape policy. The
judgment can serve as a focal point.65 It can help wide social groups act
together for the same cause. People who would otherwise not know they
have a common interest are provided an opportunity to resist the policies
of their governments and to collaborate with others in a social struggle.
The pushback against judgments of the CJEU is part of a general
framework of regime design across the European Union. Instead of fol-
lowing a classical system of separation of powers whereby each institution
61. See LISA J. CONANT, JUSTICE CONTAINED: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION 32–38 (2002).
62. Case C-120/78, Rewe Zentrale AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fu¨r Branntwein
1979 E.C.R. 649.
63. See CONANT, supra note 61, at 1–2.
64. See id. at 11–14.
65. See David S. Law, A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Review, 97 GEO. L. J.
723, 759–62 (2009) (explaining how courts, including the ECJ in the Cassis case, create focal
points for coordination); Tom Ginsburg & Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy:
An Expressive Theory of International Dispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1229,
1275 (2004) (suggesting that the International Court of Justice can solve conflicts between
states by clarifying ambiguities in conventions and creating focal points for cooperation).
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has a distinct realm of influence, the European Union is constructed as a
complicated system of checks and balances. The constant friction between
institutions is used to protect against potential abuses of power.66
The resistance to judgments and the countervailing forces that call to
implement them spread information to the public about the underlying
interests involved.67 Generally speaking, this can reduce social inequality
by letting more people take part in the political process. But courts are
doing more than just starting a debate. They are also framing the debate
and potentially determining its outcome. Therefore, to the extent that the
process before international courts favors certain groups more than
others,68 the outcome of the contestation that follows a judgment is not
guaranteed to be egalitarian. But the goal of this paper is not to assess the
final impact of judicial intervention on the division of wealth in society. It
is to argue that international courts lead to more, rather than less public
deliberation; that they involve larger segments of society in the debates
that determine their rights.
The CJEU relies on the involvement of the public not just after its
judgments are issued. It also benefits from public participation as a
method to expose itself to new cases. The CJEU can obtain cases through
three channels: (1) a preliminary reference from national courts that refer
to it questions of EU law, (2) an infringement case started by the Commis-
sion based on a complaint by an individual or an NGO, and (3) an in-
fringement procedure which is started at the initiative of the Commission.
Since about 2008, the number of cases started by the Commission has de-
clined steeply, while the number of cases initiated by a preliminary refer-
ence from a national court has increased.69 At the same time, about three-
quarters of the cases brought by the Commission have started with a com-
plaint and not on the Commission’s own initiative.70
These trends clearly show that the Commission is scaling down the use
of the “police patrol” model where a centralized agency monitors viola-
tions systematically. Instead, the Commission is shifting to a “fire alarm”
66. See ROBERT SCHU¨TZE, EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 84 (2012).
67. See Eyal Benvenisti, Judicial Review and Democratic Failures: Minimizing Asym-
metric Information Through Adjudication, 32 TEL AVIV UNI. L. REV 277 (2010) (Hebrew)
(demonstrating how adjudication can help spread information to wider social groups in
Israel).
68. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC. REV. 95 (1974) (arguing that repeat players have an
inherent advantage in shaping the law to favor their interests); CONANT, supra note 61, at
18–21(arguing that disadvantaged and poor groups cannot always succeed in changing society
through the courts); David Kennedy, The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the
Problem?, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 101 (2002) (arguing more generally that the human rights
discourse is not always beneficial for the disadvantaged).
69. See Andreas Hofmann, Legal Rights and Practical Effect: Why the European Com-
mission Supports Access to Justice for interest groups, 8 (Mar. 2016), https://www.researchgate
.net/publication/303459229_Legal_Rights_and_Practical_Effect_Why_the_European_Com
mission_Supports_Access_to_Justice_for_interest_groups.
70. Id. at 3.
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model where it receives information on violations from many diverse
sources and acts based on this information. The preliminary references
route is an even more diversified system because it allows national courts
to refer cases to the CJEU and these national courts, in turn, initiate pro-
ceedings based on the applications of individuals. The foremost advantage
of the “fire alarm” model is that it allows more supervision of violations
with a small investment by formal institutions. A “fire alarm” model relies
on the incentives of individuals to keep the system working efficiently.71
The practice of the CJEU shows that individuals, corporations, or
NGOs which disagree with the policies of the executive in their countries
are required to act. They cannot just sit back and let an international court
do the work for them. They must bring cases to the attention of the CJEU,
and they must fight for the implementation of its judgments. The success
of the system relies on the willingness of segments of the public to act. It
creates incentives and opportunities for people to get involved in politics
and thus increases public deliberation.
B. The Legislative Branch
There are two ways in which international courts shape the behavior
of parliaments. The first is an effect on parliamentary agendas: interna-
tional courts incentivize parliaments to legislate in order to protect the
state’s interest. The second is a subtler influence, an influence on the type
of arguments used in parliamentary discussions.
Regarding the first type of influence, the legislative changes under-
taken by numerous countries following their acceptance of the ICC’s juris-
diction is a perfect example. The ICC adopted a rule of admissibility
known as complementarity, according to which it will not prosecute sus-
pected war criminals that were investigated or prosecuted in a country
with a judicial system that is willing and able to prosecute them itself.72
Because ICC prosecution can cause enormous damage to the reputation of
states, many states have taken steps to prove that they are willing and able
to prosecute their own soldiers if they commit crimes. One of these steps is
to change national legislation and define as crimes the criminal actions
described by the Rome Statute—the treaty that founded the ICC.73
Regarding the second type of influence, scholars have investigated the
effect that courts such as the CJEU have on parliamentary discussion.
These scholars argue that, just like international courts frame debates in
the public at large,74 they can shape the way parliaments discuss issues of
legal rights. Parliaments that are exposed to judicial challenges from the
CJEU become accustomed to defending their laws by reliance on tech-
71. See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Over-
looked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 168 (1984).
72. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art.17(a)-(b), July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
73. See JANN K. KLEFFNER, COMPLEMENTARITY IN THE ROME STATUTE AND NA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTIONS 333–37 (2008).
74. See supra Part IB.
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niques of balancing and proportionality. They ground their provisions in
abstract concepts of rights that resemble the reasoning used by constitu-
tional courts.75
These two impacts that international courts have on parliaments imply
that more legislation will be initiated, leading to more deliberation among
the public and its elected representatives. At the same time, they ensure
that parliamentary discussions will be framed in a way that stresses indi-
vidual rights and the tools of constitutional law. Because of this, delibera-
tion in the parliament will be improved in the same way that it is improved
in the public at large.76
C. The Judicial Branch
International courts can improve deliberation indirectly by strength-
ening national courts. National courts can create friction between social
groups, spreading information to wide segments of the public. But national
courts are also able to resist foreign influence on the state and make do-
mestic politics meaningful for their countries’ policymaking. Understand-
ing how international courts can assist national courts requires reviewing
the challenges national courts face.
National judges in democratic countries are often independent from
their government. This allows them to make unpopular decisions in some
cases.77 However, the judiciary as a whole cannot ignore public opinion
completely.78 To maintain their legitimacy, national courts cannot clash
with their governments on issues that form the core of the governments’
agendas.79 To some extent, national courts are forced to serve their gov-
ernments’ interests.80
75. See ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS
IN EUROPE 204 (2000) (describing how parliaments use judicial methods of reasoning to pro-
tect their statutes from judicial review).
76. See supra note 20; see also Kevin L. Cope, Congress’s International Legal Dis-
course, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1115, 1120 (2015) (showing that even members of the U.S. Con-
gress refer to international law in their deliberations, probably to strengthen the country’s
international reputation).
77. See Or Bassok & Yoav Dotan, Solving the Countermajoritarian Difficulty?, 11
INT’L J. CON. L. 13, 33 (2013) (suggesting that the public wants to be bound by national
courts even when the courts make unpopular decisions).
78. See John Ferejohn, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining Judicial
Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 353 (1999) (arguing that in the U.S. judges are indepen-
dent, but the judiciary is constrained by the government).
79. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH – THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 239 (2d. ed. 1986) (explaining that national courts must
avoid making decisions that can lead to too much public resistance); Frederick Schauer, For-
ward: The Court’s Agenda – and the Nation’s, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4, 44, 59–62 (2006) (arguing
that the U.S. Supreme Court focuses on issues that are not of the highest concern for the
public at the time in which the judgment is issued).
80. See Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a
National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 293 (1957) (showing that the U.S. Supreme Court
follows the preferred policies of the elected branches).
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Traditionally, governments viewed international law as a threat, some-
thing that could limit the ability of the executive to act effectively. Conse-
quently, national courts were called upon to counter this threat by
strategically avoiding international law in their judgments.81 But in today’s
globalized world, governments are facing powerful external pressures and
may use international law to resist these pressures. Governments some-
times want to be bound by the provisions of international law as a mecha-
nism of self-commitment that allows them to defy the wishes of foreign
powers.82 National courts today are called upon not to avoid international
law, but to use it as a tool to protect their governments from the demands
of other countries.83
To constrain their governments effectively and give them the force to
resist foreign intervention, national courts need to cooperate with each
other and present a united front.84 Cooperation between national courts is
difficult because these courts do not always have an incentive to punish
defecting courts and rarely have the means to do so effectively.85 Fortu-
nately, international courts are sometimes able to improve the cooperation
between national courts.
One example of international courts acting as a tool to promote coop-
eration between national courts is the collaboration between national
courts in the Benelux countries and the CJEU. Scholars have argued that
the smaller countries in Europe rely on the CJEU to coordinate their re-
sistance against pressures from the bigger economies in the continent. The
Dutch and Belgian national courts refer many cases to the CJEU, relative
to the size of their national populations, thus allowing the CJEU to be-
come a powerful agent that can protect their governments from foreign
pressures.86
International courts today are a vital tool to strengthen national courts
as they resist foreign pressures. Pressures by foreign governments are the
ultimate enemy of healthy public deliberation. These pressures are coordi-
nated by a few powerful countries who are, in turn, directed by small inter-
81. See Eyal Benvenisti, Judicial Misgivings Regarding the Application of International
Law: An Analysis of Attitudes of National Courts, 4 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 159, 167 (1993).
82. See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level
Games, 42 INT’L ORG. 427, 440 (1988) (demonstrating that it is sometimes beneficial to be
constrained by someone else to improve your own position in negotiation); THOMAS C.
SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 28 (1960) (explaining the general advantage of
commitment as a way to improve one’s position in negotiations).
83. See Eyal Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses of Foreign and
International Law by National Courts, 102 AMER. J. INT’L L. 241 (2008).
84. See Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, National Courts, Domestic Democracy,
and the Evolution of International Law, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 59, 65 (2009).
85. See Tom Ginsburg, National Courts, Domestic Democracy and the Evolution of
International Law: A Reply to Eyal Benvenisti and George Downs, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1021,
1023–26 (2009).
86. See Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Premises, Assumptions, and Impli-
cations of Van Gend en Loos: Viewed from the Perspectives of Democracy and Legitimacy of
International Institutions, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 85, 92–93 (2014).
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est groups and officials. National courts can reveal hidden facts and force
these powers out into the open, where wider segments of the public can
identify and resist them.87 Thus, international courts improve public delib-
eration indirectly by strengthening national courts and improving their
cooperation.
Weak states are threatened not only by foreign governments but also
on occasion by international organizations encroaching on state sover-
eignty and forcing states to change their policies. Organizations such as the
United Nations Security Council are controlled by powerful countries, es-
pecially the five permanent members of the Council that enjoy a veto
power over its decisions. The famous Kadi affair demonstrates how an in-
ternational court helps states resist the Security Council.
The Kadi affair concerned a suspected member of Al-Qaeda who was
subjected to certain measures, including freezing his assets, by the Security
Council. In the first Kadi judgment, the CJEU annulled the EU regulation
that restricted Kadi’s rights following the Security Council’s resolution be-
cause Kadi did not receive a proper hearing.88 In the second Kadi judg-
ment, the CJEU decided that it will only consider information that was
revealed to Kadi when determining the risk he poses to society. The court
found that the revealed information did not suffice to justify the sanctions
levied against Kadi, which were consequently annulled.89 The Kadi cases
demonstrate one way in which international judgments can protect all
member states of the European Union from the Security Council. They
allowed the publics in these states to determine their own fates without
being subjected to foreign influence. Furthermore, the judgment specifi-
cally addresses the exposure of information and prevents secret proceed-
ings from harming the rights of suspects.
International courts can do even more than minimize the effects of
external influence on states. They can have a direct effect on the publics
within states and push social groups to action, sometimes even against re-
sistance from the states’ national courts. A good example of that is the way
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) shaped the internal debate within
the United States on the execution of foreigners.
In the Avena judgment,90 the ICJ required the United States to review
some convictions of Mexican nationals who were sentenced to death be-
cause they were not granted their rights under the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations.91 Although the U.S. Supreme Court in the Medellin
case92 eventually decided that the ICJ judgment had no effect in U.S. do-
87. See id at 95.
88. Case C-402/05P, Kadi v. Comm’n, 2008 E.C.R. I-6351.
89. Joined cases C-584/10P, C-593/10P, and C 595/10P, Comm’n v. Kadi, 2013,
ECLI:EU:C:2013:176.
90. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment,
2004 I.C.J. Rep. 12, ¶ 12 (Mar. 31).
91. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, art. 36, ¶ 1–2, Apr. 24, 1963, 596
U.N.T.S. 261.
92. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
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mestic law and should be ignored, the ICJ judgment certainly influenced
United States politics. In fact, President George W. Bush himself signed a
memorandum to the Attorney General stating that the United States
would comply with the ICJ’s decision.93 The decision of the Supreme
Court to ignore the memorandum sealed the fate of the convicts, but it did
not change the fact that the ICJ spurred a political debate, reaching all the
way to the highest echelons of power.94
III. LAWYERS: THE INVISIBLE COLLEGE REVEALED
In 1977, Oscar Schachter coined the term “the invisible college of in-
ternational lawyers” to refer to the global community of professional law-
yers and scholars that together develop international law.95 In the twenty-
first century, international courts are proving more and more essential for
the success of this global community. International courts act as hubs
where professional lawyers are trained and where they can network with
other lawyers. By strengthening the worldwide network of professional
lawyers, international courts give this network the ability to enrich public
debate within their countries.
A. Training International Lawyers
Many law students today view internships at international courts as a
vital part of their legal education. The International Criminal Court offers
numerous possibilities for interns and visitors.96 The International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)97 and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)98 also have active internship pro-
grams. The CJEU offers traineeships for lawyers and political scientists,99
as does the ECtHR.100
The networks formed and the knowledge acquired during such intern-
ships can shape the careers of the global elite of lawyers. For example, the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights—the body which refers
93. President’s Determination Regarding U.S. Response to the Avena Decision in the
ICJ – Memorandum for the Attorney General, DIG. OF U.S. PRAC. IN INT’L LAW (Feb. 28,
2005), https://www.state.gov/s/l/2005/87181.htm.
94. I thank W. Michael Reisman for this idea.
95. Oscar Schachter, The Invisible College of International Lawyers, 72 NW. U. L. REV.
217 (1977).
96. See Internships and Visiting Professionals, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/
jobs/Pages/internships-and-Visiting-Professionals.aspx (last visited Mar. 21, 2018).
97. See Employment and Internships, INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGO-
SLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/en/employment/internships (last visited Mar. 21, 2018).
98. See Conditions Governing The ICTR Internship Programme, INT’L CRIM. TRIBU-
NAL FOR RWANDA, http://ictr-archive09.library.cornell.edu/default.html (last visited Mar. 21,
2018).
99. See Traineeships, CT. OF JUST. OF THE EUR. UNION, http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/
jcms/Jo2_7008/traineeships (last visited Mar. 21, 2018).
100. See Recruitment at the Court, EUR. CT. OF HUM. RTS., http://www.echr.coe.int/
pages/home.aspx?p=employmentandtraineeships&c= (last visited Mar. 21, 2018).
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cases to the IACHR—boasts that many of its previous fellows and interns
have gone on to defend human rights in their own countries.101 The
IACHR itself also has an internship program that gives selected people
valuable knowledge of the Inter-American system for human rights.102
People who work at international courts understand the way the system
works from within and can use that knowledge when they litigate before
such courts years later.
Furthermore, international courts are not filled only by judges. Some
courts, such as international criminal courts or the ECtHR, have a very
large professional staff.103 In the ECtHR, the legal staff works under the
direction of the registrar, not individual judges. Scholars explained that the
staff has a substantial influence on the actual judgments of the court. This
influence is due in part to the fact that many ECtHR judges are not profi-
cient enough in the use of English and French, the two official languages
of the court.104 The large group of influential lawyers who are reared
within international courts will continue to cast their impact on interna-
tional law throughout their professional life.
Finally, international courts provide an opportunity for litigators to
establish their names and build an expertise in appearing before specific
courts. Many of the expert litigators are “repeat players”—they continu-
ously litigate before the same court.105 There are even people who manage
to switch roles during their career, working at the court for several years
and later representing their governments before the same court or ac-
cepting an academic position.106 These people who know international
courts inside and out are the ambassadors that push the principles and
ways of reasoning from international courts to the discourse in their home
countries.
B. Lawyers in the Domestic Arena
Despite the important influence that international courts have on the
lawyers they cultivate, their chief impact on public deliberation is probably
through the lawyers that are recruited to resist them. Vibrant law is a re-
101. See Internships, INTER-AM. COMMISSION ON HUM. RTS., http://www.oas.org/en/
iachr/employment/internships.asp (last visited Mar. 21, 2018).
102. See Huneeus, supra note 46, at 530; Internship and Visiting Professional Program,
INTER-AM. CT. OF HUM. RTS., http://www.corteidh.or.cr/index.php/en/about-us/programa-
pasantias (last visited Mar. 21, 2018).
103. STE´PHANIE CARTIER & CRISTINA HOSS, The Role of Registries and Legal Secretari-
ats in International Judicial Institutions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INT’L ADJUDICATION
(Cesare P.R. Romano ET AL. eds., 2013) 712, 713-714 (counting the hundreds of professionals
who work in these courts).
104. See Paul L. McKaskle, The European Court of Human Rights: What It Is, How It
Works, and Its Future, 40 U.S. FLA. L. REV. 1, 26–31 (2005).
105. See Antoine Vauchez, Communities of International Litigators, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INT’L ADJUDICATION 655, 657 (Cesare P.R. Romano ET AL., eds., 2013).
106. Id. at 661.
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sult of perpetual struggle,107 and it is the struggle of domestic bodies
against international courts that forms the latter’s most significant contri-
bution to society.
For example, states have reacted to the possibility of ICC prosecution
against their soldiers and officers by creating large bureaucracies of legal
experts to advise their militaries.108 These advisers are hired, in part, to
defend the state from international prosecution. In the process, they sub-
stitute the discretion of combatants in ways that can lead, according to
some scholars, to more rather than less war crimes.109 Nevertheless, these
lawyers remain influential players in their respective states for many more
years. Scholars who have studied the long-term influence of lawyers on
their governments generally conclude that lawyers can help protect de-
mocracy, liberal values, and the rule of law.110 The ICC therefore fortifies
the legal community in numerous states and allows it to create the condi-
tions that will ensure vibrant public deliberation in the future.
Besides training lawyers and spurring states to train lawyers as a
counterforce, international courts also cooperate with domestic lawyers
and empower them. The IACHR, for example, has been ordering states to
investigate severe human rights violations and supervising the criminal
process within states.111 Through its guidance, the IACHR improves the
quality of legal systems under its jurisdiction, sometimes even by specifi-
cally requiring relevant legal training by government officials.112 This fos-
ters the necessary conditions for functioning democratic regimes across
the region.
C. Scholars
Legal academia has manifested a persistent and growing interest in
international courts. Large research centers such as the Centre on Interna-
tional Courts and Tribunals at University College London, iCourts at the
University of Copenhagen, and PluriCourts at the University of Oslo have
been created specifically to study international courts. The literature on
107. RUDOLPH VON JHERING, THE STRUGGLE FOR LAW 138 (John J. Lalor trans., The
Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2d. ed. 1915).
108. See, e.g., Amichai Cohen, Legal Operational Advice in the Israeli Defense Forces:
The International Law Department and the Changing Nature of International Humanitarian
Law, 26 CONN. J. INT’L L. 367, 398–402 (2011) (demonstrating how legal advisers shape the
behavior of combatants).
109. See Or Bassok, Missing in Action: The Human Eye, in CONSTITUTIONS ACROSS
BORDERS IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST TERRORISM 283–84 (Federico Fabbrini & Vicki C.
Jackson eds., 2016).
110. See Terence C. Halliday, Lucien Karpik & Malcolm Feeley, Introduction—the Le-
gal Complex in Struggles for Political Liberalism, in FIGHTING FOR POLITICAL FREEDOM:
COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF THE LEGAL COMPLEX AND POLITICAL CHANGE 1–9 (Terence C.
Halliday, ET. AL. eds., 2007).
111. See Alexandra Huneeus, International Criminal Law by Other Means: The Quasi-
Criminal Jurisdiction of the Human Rights Courts, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 1–2 (2013)
112. See id. at 20–22.
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international courts is booming, and they are subjected to increasingly so-
phisticated analyses.113
The scholarly interest aroused by international courts is conducive to
an informed discussion of the issues on their agendas. Landmark cases of
international courts are becoming synonymous with legal principles that
shape academic discourse.114 New cases are often at the center of aca-
demic attention. They are summarized in journals such as the American
Journal of International Law and inspire discussions in legal blogs.115 In
this way, international courts are inspiring an active scholarly debate that
involves lawyers as well as political scientists and international relations
experts. The scholarly discussions trickle down and affect political deliber-
ation world-wide.116
Scholars have argued that international courts such as the CJEU owe
a large measure of their success to the constant promotion of their ideas
by academics.117 The symbiosis between scholars and judges is the key to
forming so-called “epistemic communities” around international courts—
networks of professionals armed with specialized knowledge that can use
this knowledge to shape policymaking.118
CONCLUSION: IMPROVEMENT BY DIALOGUE
The key to sustaining a stable democracy is an informed public. With-
out an informed public, small interest groups can capture the government
and take advantage of the rest of the population.119 Public deliberation, in
turn, is essential for informing the public, but such deliberation is often
hard to achieve.
Rational people have an incentive to invest their energy in choices
that affect their own lives, such as choosing where to live or what com-
puter to buy, and not in political debates that offer virtually no chance of
113. See, e.g., Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International
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improving their personal well-being.120 Politics is sometimes appealing to
people, but when large segments of the public realize how hard it is to
make a difference, they often turn their attention to their own private
lives.121 It is therefore essential to design institutions that keep public de-
liberation going.
The goal of this paper is to demonstrate that international courts can
do exactly that. It refutes the simplistic view under which every decision
made by an international court is taken out of the public debate. Instead,
the paper argues that judgments of international courts can spur political
debates and provide conditions that make these debates more vibrant and
constructive for social change.
International courts furnish legal arguments that help the people un-
derstand their rights. They cultivate networks within the public that im-
prove the flow of accurate information about human rights violations.
International courts mobilize the public to counter resistance by the exec-
utive branch. They motivate parliaments to act, and they increase the abil-
ity of national courts to protect wide segments of the public. Finally,
international courts foster global and domestic elites of lawyers who can
enhance the public’s ability to fight for their rights.
All this does not mean that intervention by international courts is al-
ways an unmitigated good. Judicial intervention can very well be unneces-
sary, biased, or harmful.122 But taking the arguments in this paper
seriously does imply that examining the costs and benefits of action by
international courts must be much more refined. International courts are
not constructed to provide final answers to burning social questions. They
engage in an ongoing dialogue with the public and with all domestic
branches of government. This dialogue has a crucial positive side effect—it
invigorates public deliberation.
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122. See MATTHEW PARISH, MIRAGES OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE: THE ELUSIVE PUR-
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